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CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-FOURTEENTH

AMENDMENT-STATE

Ac-

TION-SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCEss-The United States Supreme

Court has held that the failure of a state operated child protection
agency to provide adequate protection to a child from his parent's
violence does not violate that child's rights under the substantive

component of the Due Process Clause.
Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S.
, 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989).
Joshua Deshaney, a minor child, lived with his father, Randy
Deshaney, pursuant to a divorce decree which awarded custody of
Joshua to his father.1 In March of 1984, Randy Deshaney beat
Joshua with such severity that he lapsed into a life threatening
coma from which he has not fully recovered. 2
Winnebago County Department of Social Services (hereinafter

DSS) first learned of potential child abuse in January of 1982,
when Randy Deshaney's second wife complained to the police that
Randy had previously hit Joshua and was abusing the child.3 DSS
interviewed Randy Deshaney who denied any wrongdoing. 4 DSS
did not pursue the matter on this particular occasion.'
In January of 1983, Joshua was admitted to the hospital.' The
examining physician, suspecting child abuse, notified DSS. 7 DSS
obtained a court order placing Joshua in the temporary custody of
the hospital.' Three days later, an ad hoc committee, "The Child
Protection Team," 9 concluded that the evidence was insufficient to
warrant any further retention of Joshua in the custody of the
court. 10 The committee recommended the implementation of certain preventative measures." "Based on the recommendation of
1. Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. -_, 109 S. Ct. 998,
1001 (1989).
2. Id at 1002.
3. Id. at 1001.
4. Id.
5. Id..
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. This team consisted of a pediatrician, a psychologist, a police detective, the
county's lawyer, several DSS caseworkers and various hospital personnel. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. These measures included; enrolling Joshua in a preschool program, providing
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the Child Protection Team, the juvenile court dismissed the child
protection case and returned Joshua to the custody of his
father.

12

One month later, hospital emergency room personnel called DSS
to report that Joshua had once again been treated for injuries they
suspected to be child abuse. 13 The caseworker decided that there
was no basis for offering DSS protection to Joshua at this time."4
Over the next six months, the caseworker recorded that suspicious
injuries appeared on Joshua's head and that the recommendations
of the Child Protection Team had not been followed.' 5 No DSS
6
action was taken to remove Joshua from his father's custody.'
In November of 1983, the emergency room personnel once again
notified DSS that Joshua had been treated for injuries that were
suspicious and possibly caused by child abuse. 17 On the
caseworker's visits to Joshua's home, to monitor his status, she was
told that Joshua was too ill to see her.' 8 DSS did not take any
action.' This incident was followed by the March, 1984 beating of
Joshua which was the subject of the complaint.2 0
The complaint was instituted by Joshua and his mother under
title 42 of the United States Code, Section 1983,2" in a United
States District Court against Winnebago County, DSS, and various
caseworkers involved in monitoring Joshua's case.2 2 The basis of
the complaint was that the respondents deprived Joshua of his liberty interest without due process of law in violation of the Fourhis father with certain counseling services and encouraging his father's girl friend to move
out of the home. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1002.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1986) Entitled, "Civil Action For Deprivation Of Rights",
provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
or any state or territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proceeding for redress.
Id.
22. Deshaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1002.
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teenth Amendment 2 of the United States Constitution. The deprivation occured due to the respondents' failure to protect Joshua
from a "risk of violence" that the respondents perceived or should
have perceived.2 4 The District Court granted the respondent's motion for summary judgement.2"
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed26 the district court's decision, holding that the petitioners did not make out
an actionable section 1983 claim.2 7 The Court of Appeals gave two
reasons for their decision.2 8 First, the Due Process Clause does not
impose the requirement that a state or local government protect its
own citizens from "private violence" or mishaps inflicted by non
state actors which is not attributable to the conduct of its employees. 29 The Court rejected the "special relationship" 3 theory first
enunciated in Jensen v. Conrad3 1 and applied in Estate of Bailey
by Oare v. County of York. 32 Second, relying on Martinez v. Cali23. The Fourteenth Amendment states that: "No state shall... deprive any person of
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.
24. Deshaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1002.
25. Id.
26. Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 812 F.2d. 298 (7th Cir.
1987).
27. Deshaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1002.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. "The 'special relationship' theory states that once the state learns a particular
child is in danger of abuse from third parties and actually undertakes to protect him from
that danger, a 'special relationship' arises between it and the child which imposes an affirmative constitutional duty to provide adequate protection." Id.
31. 747 F.2d. 185 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985). In Jensen, the
estates of two minor children who died after suffering beatings at the hands of their guardians brought suit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against the commissioner of the South Carolina Department of Social Services. Id. at 187. The plaintiffs' complaint alleged that, due to
the actions of the state's employees in failing to intervene and provide protection, the childrens' Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. Id. This case presented the question of
whether the defendant's failure to provide affirmative protection for the plaintiff's decedent
created an actionable section 1983 claim. Id. The court concluded that, "at the time of the
alleged violation, a constitutional right of affirmative protection was not clearly established
and therefore a good faith immunity was available to the defendants." Id. at 194-195. The
court left open the possibility that, provided with a different set of facts, there would be
authority to develop the definition and finding of a special relationship giving rise to affirmative protection. Id. at 195.
32. 768 F.2d. 503 (3rd. Cir. 1985). In Estate of Bailey by Oare, the plaintiffs brought
an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against the defendants (state child protection
agency) alleging that the decedant's death from child abuse was the result of the actions of
the defendants who deprived her and her father of their constitutional rights. Id. at 505.
The court recognized that a right to affirmative protection need not be limited to determination that there was a custodial relationship. Id. at 509. A special relationship could give
rise to a right of protection. Id. The factors relevant to such a relationship were; "whether
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fornia,33 the causal connection between the conduct of DSS and
Joshua's injuries was not sufficient to establish a deprivation of
constitutional rights providing an actionable claim under section
1983. 84
Recognizing the conflicts between the holdings among the Circuit Courts of Appeal and the importance of the issue to the functioning of state and local governments, the Supreme Court of the
United States granted certiorari.3 5 The decision of the Court of
Appeals was affirmed. 6
The issue presented in this case was whether the failure of a
state-operated child protection agency to provide adequate protective services to a child from an abusive parent, and who is later
harmed by that parent, constitutes a violation of that child's substantive Due Process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution. The majority opinion held that the
failure of a state operated child protection agency to provide adequate protection to a child from his parent's violence does not violate that child's rights under the substantive component of the
37
Due Process Clause.

The majority opinion 38 began by defining the nature of petitioner's claim as one which involved the substantive rather than
the procedural component of the Due Process Clause.3 9 The peti-

tioners did not claim that the state denied Joshua protection without appropriate procedural safeguards.40 The petitioner argued
the victim or perpetrator was in legal custody at the time of or prior to the incident;
whether the state had expressly stated its desire to provide affirmative protection to a particular class or specific individuals; and whether the state knew of the victim's plight." Id.
33. 444 U.S. 277 (1980). In Martinez, the appellants' fifteen year old daughter was
murdered by a parolee five months after being released from prison despite having a history
of sex offenses. Id. at 279-280. Appellant brought an action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983
claiming that the appellee, state officials, by releasing the parolee, subjected the decedent to
a deprivation of her life without due process of law. Id. at 283. The court held that the
parolee was in no sense an agent of the parole board. Id. at 285 The parole board was not
aware that the appellant's decedent faced any special danger as distinguished from the general public. Id. The appellant's death was too remote a consequence of the parole officers
action to hold them responsible. Id.
34. Deshaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1002.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1004.
38. Id. Rehnquist, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White, Stevens,
O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy, JJ., joined. Id. at 1000.
39. Deshaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1003.
40. Id.
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that the Wisconsin child protection statute"1 gave Joshua an entitlement to receive services enjoying Due Process protection. The
Court declined to hear this argument as it was not pleaded in the
complaint, argued to the Court of Appeals, or raised in the petition
for certiorari.4 2
The majority opinion continued its rationale by stating that
nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause requires the
state to protect the life, liberty or property interests of the citizenry against deprivations of those interests by private non state
actors. 3 The state does not have an affirmative obligation to ensure that those interests do not come to harm through means other
than those involving state action.44 The majority states that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended
to prevent government from using its power in an abusive manner
as an instrument of oppression.4 The purpose of the Due Process
Clause is to protect people from the state, not to protect them
from each other." Since the Due Process Clause does not impose a
duty on the state to provide its citizens with any particular type of
protective services, the state cannot be held liable under that
clause for injuries that might have been avoided had it chosen to
provide such services.47
Petitioners next argued that a "special relationship '"' existed
between Joshua and DSS, thus requiring due process protection.
Once the state became involved in protecting Joshua from danger,
the state acquired an affirmative duty, to protect Joshua in a reasonably competent manner.4 The Court rejected this argument."
While the court has recognized affirmative state duties to care for
particular individuals in prior decisions, 51 they had no such duty in
41. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 48.981 (West 1983). Section 48.981 provides:
(1) Definitions
(a) "Abuse"
1 Physical injury inflicted on a child by other than accidental means.
(2) Persons required to report a physician . . . social or public assistance worker...
Id.
42. Deshaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1003 n.2.
43. Id. at 1003.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1004.
48. See Supra, note 30.
49. Deshaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1004.
50. Id.
51. EsteUe v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). A prison inmate brought an action under 42
U.S.C. Section 1983 against the state correction department medical director and prison
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this case.". The substance of this line of cases is that when the
state takes a person into custody and holds him there against his
will, it acquires a constitutional duty to assume responsibility for
the safety and general well being of the individual." The Court
stated that the Estelie-Youngberg54 analysis did not apply to this
case. 55 The harms that Joshua suffered were not inflicted by the
state nor did they occur while he was in the custody of the state,
but while he was in the custody of his natural father, who cannot
be considered a "state actor."5 Thus, the respondents failure to
provide Joshua with adequate protection against his father's violence did not violate his rights under the substantive component of
7
the Due Process Clause.
The majority opinion next discussed the relation of state tort
law concepts to the complaint at hand as providing a possible
cause of action and relief for the petitioners. By voluntarily undertaking to protect Joshua against a danger that it did not create,
the state may have acquired a duty under state tort law principles58 to provide him with protection from such danger. 59 The
officials claiming he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment for inadequate treatment of an injury he received while doing prison
work. Id. at 98. The court held that "deliberate indifference to a person's serious injury
states a cause of action under section 1983." Id. at 105. "An inmate must rely on prison
authorities to treat his needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met."
Id. at 103.
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982). On his mother's petition, respondent was involuntarily committed in a state institution. Respondent's mother, concerned about injuries
which respondent suffered at the institution, filed and action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983
against the institution's officials. Id. at 310. The complaint alleged that respondent suffered
injuries and that the institution failed to initiate protective measures thus violating his
rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. The Court held that the respondent had a constitutionally protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to safe conditions of confinement, freedom from unreasonable bodily restraints and minimal training required by those interests. Id. at 315-319.
52. Deshaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1004-1005.
53. Id. at 1005.
54. See supra note 51.
55. Deshaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1006.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1007.
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965) provides:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another
which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's person or
things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure
to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise
such care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) the harm is suffered because of the
other's reliance upon the undertaking.
Id. at 1006.
59. Deshaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1006.
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Court did not give further consideration to this rationale because
the petitioner's claim was based on the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment which does not transform every tort committed by a state actor into a constitutional violation. 0
The dissenting opinion, 61 written by Justice Brennan takes issue
with the majority's characterization of the case. The dissent focuses on the action that Wisconsin has taken with respect to the
problem of abused children rather than concentrating on the actions the state failed to initiate.2
In Estelle v. Gamble63 and Youngberg v. Romeo"4 certain individuals were confined by the state. This initial state action rendered these individuals powerless to help themselves or to seek
help from sources that were unconnected to the state. The majority dismissed Youngberg by characterizing the confinement as the
deprivation of liberty triggering the protections of the Due Process
Clause.66 However, in Youngberg the confinement was not challenged but rather the state's failure to provide constitutionally required conditions of confinement.6 In the opinion of the dissent,
the conduct in Youngberg (confinement) would have led to no injury, and therefore no actionable claim under section 1983, unless
the state had failed in some respect to protect the person confined
from himself and from others.6 8 In addition, state action can involve more than actual physical restraint. 9
Justice Brennan recognized that "the State's knowledge of an individual's predicament and its expressions of intent to help him
can amount to a limitation of his freedom to act on his own behalf
or to obtain help from others.

'7 0

If a state deprives a person of

private sources of aid and then refuses aid, any harm that results
from its inaction is attributable to the state's conduct and ac60. Id. at 1007.
61. Id. Justice Brennan with whom Justice Marshall and Justice Blackmun join. 109
S. Ct. at 1007.
62. Deshaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1008.
63. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
64. 457 U.S. 367 (1982).
65. Deshaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1008.
66. Id. at 1008-1009.
67. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 at 310 (1982).
68. Deshaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1009.
69. White v Rochford, 592 F.2d. 381 (7th Cir. 1979). In White, police officers arrested
the guardians of young children. Id. at 382. The police officers left the children on a busy
stretch of highway at night. Id. The court held this to be a violation of due process. Id. at
384-385.
70. Deshaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1009.

394
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tions.7 ' Wisconsin law invites and directs, its citizens to depend on
local departments of social services to protect children from
abuse.7 Many people may have contributed information and advice on what to do with Joshua, but, it was up to DSS to make the
final decision upon whether to disturb Joshua's current living arrangements. 3 Wisconsin's child welfare program, has relieved ordinary citizens and governmental authorities of any obligation to do
anything more than report their suspicions of child abuse to DSS. 7"
Wisconsin's child protection program in effect was a confinement
of Joshua Deshaney to Randy Deshaney's violent home until DSS
decided to take action to remedy the situation.7 5 The state intervened in Joshua's life via its child protection program and, by virtue of this intervention, acquired knowledge that Joshua was in
grave danger of parental child abuse. Justice Brennan stated,
"My disagreement with the Court arises from its failure to see that
state inaction can be every bit an abuse of power as state action,
that oppression can result when a state undertakes a vital duty
77
and then ignores it."
Justice Blackmun's dissent focused on concepts of natural justice and a broad interpretation of fundamental rights. 8 Justice
Blackmun admonished the Court for being unmoved by natural
sympathy.7 9 The facts of this case involved more than just passivity, they involve active state intervention in the life of Joshua
Deshaney and this intervention was the impetus triggering a fundamental duty to aid Joshua once the state learned of his predicament. 0 By focusing on the formalistic and rigid concepts of state
action or inaction, the Court failed to give proper meaning to the
protection designed to be enforced via the Fourteenth Amendment.8 1 Justice Blackmun believes formalistic reasoning has no
place in the interpretation of the broad meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment.2 Faced with a broad or narrow interpretation of the
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id. at 1010.
Id. at 1010-1011.
Id. at 1011.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1012.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
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Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Blackmun would adopt a "sympathetic" reading, invoking the concepts of fundamental justice and
recognizing that compassion and the process of judgement are
coterminous8 5
An essential prerequisite for the redress of a grievance involving
a violation of rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment via section 1983 is state action. Therefore, the
Deshaney decision must be viewed in light of the concept of "state
action" as it has developed to date. The first reasoned treatment of
the concept of state action came in the Civil Rights Cases.8 4 The
significance of these cases, for purposes of the development of the
concept of state action, lies in the Court's explanation of the concept. The Court held that the individual invasion of individual
rights was not the province of the Fourteenth Amendment.8 5 The
concern of the Fourteenth Amendment was in nullifying state legislation which violated the privileges and immunities, due process,
or equal protection of the laws of citizens of the states.8 6 The Fourteenth Amendment existed to provide a remedy against the operation of state laws and the activities of state executive and judicial
officials which infringed on fundamental rights as specified in the
87
Fourteenth Amendment.
The Civil Rights Cases enunciated the basic concept that the
Fourteenth Amendment only prohibits "state action" and does not
deal with purely private conduct.8 However, the definition of the
term "state action" has generated and continues to generate significant controversy.8 9 The following cases suggest the definitional pa83. Id.
84. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). Under the Fourteenth Amendment, it is state action of a particular character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject
matter of the amendment. . . . It nullifies and makes void all state legislation, and state
action of every kind, which impairs the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States, or which impairs them in life, liberty or property without Due Process of law, or
which denies to any of them the equal protection of the laws. The last section of the amendment invests Congress with power to adopt appropriate legislation for correcting the effects
of such prohibited State laws and State acts, and thus to render them effectually null, void
and innocuous. It does not authorize Congress to create a code of municipal law for the
regulation of private rights; but to provide a mode of redress against the operation of State
laws, and the actions of State officers, executive or judicial, when these are subversive of the
fundamental rights specified in the amendment.
Id. at 11.
85. Id. at 11.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. LOCKHART, KAMISAR, CHOPER, SHIFFRIN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1413-1414 (1986).
89. Id.
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rameters that the Court has laid down over the years in an attempt
to define the concept. The first type of state action is where a public or government function is performed by a private actor to the
deprivation of an individual's rights secured by the Constitution." °
The state cannot avoid responsibility under the Constitution for
the conduct of private parties when the state delegates otherwise
governmental functions to private parties." Private actors are subject to the same constraints imposed on the state by the Constitution when they perform activities or functions which involve areas
of governmental operations. 2 Private individuals performing governmental activities are subject to the same restraints imposed on
the state by the Constitution and are termed public functions. 3
In Marsh v. Alabama,94 the appellant, was distributing religious
literature on the sidewalks of a town owned by a private company. 5 The appellant was arrested for trespass because she failed
to heed the warnings of the town management which required
written permission to solicit on company owned sidewalks.9 ' The
issue presented was whether a state could impose criminal punishment on a person who undertook to distribute religious articles on
the sidewalk premises of a company owned town contrary to the
wishes of the town's management.9 7 The Court held that a state
cannot impose criminal punishment on a person who undertook to
distribute religious literature on the premises of a company owned
town contrary to the wishes of the town's management.9 The
Court further held that the owners of privately held bridges, ferries, turnpikes and railroads which are used primarily for public
enterprise may not operate them as freely as one who is engaged in
purely private enterprise.99 "Since these facilities are operated primarily to benefit the public and since their operation is essentially
NOWAK, ROTUNDA, YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 426 (1986).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. "Thus the operation of an election system, the governance of cities and towns
and perhaps the operation of seemingly public facilities such as parks will be deemed public
functions regulated by the Constitution". Id.
94. 326 U.S. 501 (1946). The Court held that it is a violation of due process for a state
to impose criminal punishment on a person for distributing religious literature in a company-owned town which conflicts with regulations of company-run management. Id. at 509.
95. Id. at 503.
96. Id. at 503-504.
97. Id. at 502.
98. Id. at 509
99. Id. at 506.
90.
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a public function, it is subject to state regulation."' 0
Another type of state action concerns those cases where there is
significant state involvement in private conduct or governmental
encouragement of private conduct that amounts to state action. 10 1
In assessing the government's complicity for the wrongs committed
by private parties otherwise encouraged or directed by the state,
the Court must consider whether there is a sufficient nexus between the wrong committed and the government encouragement.0 2
In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,0 3 the owner of a privately-owned restaurant located in an off-steet parking garage,
owned and operated by a state agency, refused service to a person
because of race. 0 4 The Court considered whether the discriminatory practices of a privately owned business located in a state
owned and operated building could be considered state action subject to the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment. 10 5 The Court
inferred that while the state is not required by the Constitution to
prohibit private discrimination, the state may not abdicate its responsibilities by ignoring them or not discharging them if such action would deny a person equal protection of the laws. 06 This action of the state agency in maintaining and operating the garage
was held to be significant participation in the private conduct,
therefore it was considered state action.0 7
In Reitman v. Mulkey, 0 8 a state passed a constitutional amendment which repealed an anti-discrimination in housing statute and
prevented further legislation regulating the sale or rental of property.' 0 9 An apartment owner then refused to rent to the petitioners
because of their race. 1 0 The issue was whether the amendment to
the California Constitution denied to any person equal protection
of the laws within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution."' The Court held that the California amendment was intended to authorize and did authorize racial
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
NOWAK, ROTUNDA, YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 432 (1986).

Id.
365 U.S. 715 (1961).
Id. at 716.
Id.
Id. at 725.
Id. at 724.
387 U.S. 369 (1967).
Id. at 374.
Id. at 372.
Id. at 370.
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discrimnination in the housing market and thus significantly encouraged and involved the state in private discrimination which
was violative of the United States Constitution.1 12
Finally, government administration of private discrimination
and judicial enforcement of private discrimination have been
found to be within the concept of state action.1 13 In Evans v
Newton,1 "" a park established by a testamentary trust required
that it be used for white persons only.1 1 5 The city of Macon, Georgia was the trustee and operator of the park. 6 The city allowed
blacks to use the' park because it contended it could not maintain
the park on a segregated basis.11 7 Individual members of the Board
of Managers of the park brought suit to have the city removed as
trustee.1 18 Black citizens intervened in the suit alleging that racial
segregation was contrary to the laws of the United States and that
the court should refuse to appoint private trustees. 1 9 The Supreme Court held that the public character of the park required it
to be treated as a public institution subject to the commands of
the Fourteenth Amendment, regardless of who has title. °
In Shelley v. Kraemer, 2 ' a group sought to enforce a covenant
restricting the sale of certain real property to members of a particular race. The issue presented was whether the enforcement, by
state courts, of restrictive covenants may be deemed the acts of the
state. 122 The Supreme Court held that although adhering to restrictive covenants on a voluntary basis is not state action, judicial
1 23
enforcement of the covenants constitutes state action.
With the foregoing areas of state action defined, it is important
to consider the limits of the doctrine in light of the most recent
developments. In Moose Lodge v. Irvis,1 2" appellee was refused service at appellant's establishment because of his race. The appellee
claimed that since the appellant was issued a liquor license by a
state agency that authorized the sale of alcoholic beverages, the
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 381.
Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
382 U.S. 296 (1966).
Id. at 297.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id at 298.
Id. at 302.
334 U.S. 1 (1948).
Id. at 18.
Id. at 20.
407 U.S. 163 (1972).
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refusal of services involved state action.1 25 The issue in this case
was whether the discriminatory actions of a private establishment,
which is issued an operating license by the state, are state actions
subject to the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 2 The
Court stated that:
The Court has never held . . .that discrimination by an otherwise private
entity would be violative of the Equal Protection Clause if the private entity receives any sort of benefit or service at all from the State, or if it is
subject to state regulation in any degree whatever. Since state-furnished
services include such necessaries of life as electricity, water, and police and
fire protection, such a holding would utterly emasculate the distinction between private as distinguished from state conduct as set forth in the Civil
Rights Cases, supra, and adhered to in subsequent decisions.127

In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.," 8 respondent, a privately owned utility, subject to state regulation by a public utility
commission, terminated the electrical service of the petitioner for
failure to pay. Petitioner brought a section 1983 action seeking
damages due to this termination.129 The petitioner argued that
under state law she had an entitlement to reasonably continuous
electrical service to her home and that the respondent's termination of that service was a deprivation of her property interest in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 30 The Court held that
there was not a sufficient connection between the respondent's actions in terminating petitioner's service and the respondent's conduct to attribute the action to the state for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment."' The Court stated that, "the inquiry must be
whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the state and
the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action
of
132
the latter may be fairly treated as that of the state itself.9
As the majority and dissenting opinions deal with the applicability of the substantive component of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the case, an understanding of the his125.
126.
127.

Id. at 165.
Id. at 171.
Id. at 173.

128. 419 U.S. 345 (1974). Petitioner, whose utility service was terminated for failure to
pay a bill, claimed that a state-regulated utility was a state actor and therefore respondent's
failure to properly notify her was a violation of due process denying her a property interest
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 347-348. The Court held that the utility was not a
state actor. Id.
129.

Id. at 347.

130. Id. at 348.
131. Id. at 358-359.
132.

Id. at 351.
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torical development of the concept is necessary to shed light on the
Court's rationale. The concept of substantive due process has its
genus in the case of Calder v. Bull."s The actual holding of the
case is not as important as the concepts developed by two opinions
set forth in the case. Justice Chase laid down the concept of natural law which later became known or embellished in the concept of
fundamental rights. Briefly stated, the position held that there are
certain rights that are so fundamental to human beings that no
government can take away or abridge regardless of the power of
the majority. 34 Furthermore, any legislation which abridged the
natural rights of the people could be held invalid by the Supreme
Court."3 5 Justice Iredell laid down the concept of positive law and
held that the legislature could exercise only that power given to
it.1 36 Justice Iredell's position would not allow the courts to enforce
natural law principles for fear that they must necessarily reflect
137
the individual Justice's view of the natural law.
Early in the Court's history, the Court was prepared to rely on
the principle of natural justice.13 However, this concept began to
shrink during the 1830's. In Barron v Mayor and City Council'3
the Court ruled that the Fifth Amendment provision, prohibiting
the taking of private property for public use without just compensation, is a limitation on the federal government and is not applicable to legislatures of the states. 4"
In 1868 the Fourteenth Amendment was made part of the
133. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
134. NOWAK, ROTUNDA, YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 332 (1986).
135. Id.
136. Id. The Iredell position states, the ideals of natural justice are regulated by no
fixed standard; the ablest and purest men have differed upon the subject; and all the court
could properly say in such an event would be that-the legislature (possessed of an equal
right of opinion) has passed an act which, in the opinion of the judges, was inconsistent with
the abstract principles of natural justice.
Id. at 399.
137. NOWAK, ROTUNDA, YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 332 (1986).
138. Terrett v Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Branch) 43 (1815). In Terrett this was made evident.
[T]hat the legislature can repeal a statute creating private corporations or conferring
to them property already acquired under the faith of previous laws, and by such repeal can vest the property of such corporations exclusively in the state, or dispose of
the same to such purposes as they may please, without the consent or default of the
corporations, we are not prepared to admit; and we think ourselves standing upon the
principle of natural justice, upon the fundamental laws of every free government,
upon the Spirit and the letter of the Constitution of the United States, and upon the
decisions of the most respectable judicial tribunals in resisting such doctrine.
Id. at 52.
139. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
140. Id. at 250-251.

1990

Recent Decision

United States Constitution.' 1 The initial inquiry was whether the
Due Process Clause of the Amendment was merely procedural or
substantive.14 2 If the Due Process Clause was procedural, life, liberty, and property could be taken by the state as long as appropriate procedural safeguards were in place. 14 3 If the Due Process
Clause was substantive, life, liberty, and property could not be
taken by the state at all regardless of the procedural guarantees
given. 144 One of the first areas to give the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment substantive meaning was in the protection of economic interests. That is, due process protection precluded the state from passing legislation or taking action to infringe on the individual's ability to engage in economic
endeavors. 145 In Lochner v. New York'14 the State of New York
passed a statute forbidding employment in a bakery for more than
sixty hours a week or ten hours a day. The issue to be decided was
whether an individual's right to purchase and sell labor is part of
the liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 47
The Court held that the statute was invalid as a deprivation of
liberty protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. 41 'Justice
Holmes, in a dissenting opinion, took the view that,
the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a rational
and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our people and our law. 4 '

Justice Harlan, dissenting, found fault with the whole concept of
interpreting legislation and would leave that chore to those situations where the Constitution of the United States was involved. 51
In Nebbia v. New York' 5' the Court moved away from substantive due process protection of economic rights via the Due Process
141. The Fourteenth Amendment states that: "No state shall ... deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law..." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
142. NOWAK, ROTUNDA, YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 321-322 (1986).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 343.
146. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The Court invalidated a New York statute forbidding employment in a bakery for more than 60 hours a week or 10 hours a day. Id. at 64.
147. Id. at 53
148. Id.
149. Id. at 76.
150. Id. at 66-73.
151. 291 U.S. 502 (1934). The Court upheld a New York regulation setting minimum
milk prices which sought to assure reasonable returns to milk producers and dealers.
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This case concerned
whether it was a violation of the due process rights of individual
buyers and producers of milk products for the State of New York
to regulate and set minimum milk prices for producers and milk
dealers.1 52 The Court held:
So far as the requirement of due process is concerned, and in the absence of
other constitutional restriction, a state is free to adopt whatever economic
policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce
that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts are without
authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is declared by the legislature, to overrule it. If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation
to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory,
the requirements of due process are satisfied. 5 '

Having discussed the development, expansion and ultimately the
rejection of substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment in the area of economic interests, the historical development,
expansion and retrenchment of substantive due process in the area
of individual rights will be reviewed. As to what rights are protected against encroachment by state governments under the Fourteenth Amendment, initially two theories were advanced on the
application of the Bill of Rights to the states. Under the total incorporation theory, the Bill of Rights was to be applied to the
states via the Fourteenth Amendment.15 ' After the passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the argument was made that the first ten
amendments to the United States Constitution were applicable to
the states via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.155 In other words, no state could deny any citizen those
rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution without due process of law. This concept was rejected in
15

Palko v Connecticut.

In Palko, the appellant was tried and convicted of second degree
murder for which he was sentenced to life imprisonment.1 57 Predicated on error, the state appealed the decision and a new trial was
152. Id. at 521.
153. Id. at 537.
154. NOWAK, ROTUNDA, YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 315 (1986).
155. Id.
156. 302 U.S. 319 (1937). The Fourteenth Amendment does not guarantee that
whatever would be a violation of the original Bill of Rights if done by the Federal Government, is also unconstitutional if done by a state, by force of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
at 323.
157. Id. at 320-321.
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ordered.' 58 Subsequently, the appellant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death.15 9 The appellant argued that
he was deprived of due process of law under the Fourteenth
Amendment.1 60 The issue presented was whether the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees against state action those acts that would
be a violation of the original Bill of Rights if done by the federal
government. 6 1 The Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment
did not include some aspects of the double jeopardy prohibitions
of the Fifth Amendment.1 62 The Palko Court, in effect, determined
that rather than total incorporation of the Bill of Rights there
would be selective incorporation. 6 ' Under the selective incorporation theory, select provisions of the Bill of Rights were held applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment.'6 To determine which select provisions apply, the relevant inquiry is whether
a particular guarantee is implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty."15
6 the appellant
In Duncan v. Louisiana'"
was convicted in a Louisiana state court of battery.6 7 Under that state's law, battery was
considered a misdemeanor punishable by a maximum penalty of
two years imprisonment.1 68 The appellant sought a jury trial but
his request was denied by the Louisiana state court.'6 9 The issue
was whether the right to trial by jury, as guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, is equally applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 ° The Court held
that under the Fourteenth Amendment, a right to trial by jury is
guaranteed in all criminal cases in state courts which, were they
tried in federal court, would come within the protections of the
Sixth Amendment.' 7 ' The Court also held that the relevant inquiry
was whether the right was fundamental to the American scheme of

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 321.
Id.
Id. at 322.
Id. at 323.
Id.
Id. at 324-328.
Id.
Id. at 325.
391 U.S. 145 (1968).
Id. at 146.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 147.
Id. at 149.
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justice.17 2
The early opinions are pervasive with finding some enumerated
provision in the Bill of Rights and its applicability to the states. It
is against this background that the development of unenumerated
rights finding substantive due process protection is set forth. The
keynote unenumerated fundamental right is the right of privacy.
The first significant case in the development of the right was
Rochin v. California.7 3 Police officers, searching the premises of
Rochin, saw capsules lying on a night stand beside the bed. 7'
Rochin seized the capsules and swallowed them.1 75 Rochin was
handcuffed and taken to a hospital where his stomach was pumped
producing the capsules. 176 The capsules contained morphine for
which Rochin was convicted of possession of narcotics.17 7 The Supreme Court held that the police officers conduct violated due process because it shocked the Court's conscience.1 8 "Due process of
law, as a historic and generative principle, precludes defining, and
thereby confining, these standards of conduct more precisely than
to say that convictions cannot be brought about by methods that
offend a sense of justice.' 7 Justice Black concurred in the judgment but found protection in the Fifth Amendment.'"a "[F]aithful
adherence to the specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights insures a
more permanent protection of individual liberty than that which
can be afforded by the nebulous [fourteenth amendment due pro18
cess] standards stated by the majority".
In Griswold v. Connecticut'8' Griswold was convicted of violating a state statute which made it a criminal offense to use contraceptives or counsel others in their use. The issue was whether the
Connecticut statute violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 18 3 The Court held that a zone of privacy exists
172. Id.
173. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
174. Id. at 166.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 172.
179. Id. at 173.
180. Id. at 174.
181. Id. at 175.
182. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The appellant, director of Planned Parenthood League of
Connecticut, gave information to married persons as to the means of preventing conception.
Id. at 480. A Connecticut statute made it a crime to use contraceptives or counsel others in
their use. Id. The appellant was found guilty under the statute. Id.
183. Id. at 481.
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protected by the Fourteenth Amendment which the state cannot
abridge. 1s4 The Court cited various decisions to advance the proposition that the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from the guarantees of the Bill
of Rights that help give them life and substance. 85 Thus, the
Court held that these guarantees create a zone of privacy which
the state cannot abridge." 6
Perhaps the most significant part of the Griswold opinion, in
terms of due process development, is that of Justice Harlan concurring in the judgment." 7 Justice Harlan's position basically
states that the Bill of Rights may provide help in determining
some of the rights protected by the Due Process Clause but Due
Process protection is not dependent on finding some enumerated
18 8
provision of the Bill of Rights applicable to redress the injury.
The Due Process Clause is broad enough to protect rights outside
of the Bill of Rights. 8 9
Finally in Roe v. Wade190 concerning whether a woman has a
right to terminate a pregnancy without state interference, the
Court finds a fundamental right of privacy existing. Roe, unmarried and pregnant, wanted to terminate her pregnancy by abortion.191 She was unable to obtain a legal abortion in Texas because
her life was not in danger.192 Roe challenged the statute as an unconstitutional invasion of her right to privacy protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. 93 The issue was whether the Texas stat184. Id. at 484.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 485.
187. Id. at 499.
[TIhe proper constitutional inquiry in this case is whether this Connecticut statute
infringes the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the enactment violates basic values "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.". . . While the
relevant inquiry may be aided by resort to one or more of the provisions of the Bill of
Rights, it is not dependent on them or any of their radiations. The Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment stands, in my opinion, on its own bottom.
Id. at 500.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). "The Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy,
or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy does exist under the Constitution." Id. at
152-153. "Where certain 'fundamental rights' are involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state interest' and that
legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests
at stake". Id. at 155.
191. Id. at 120.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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ute, denying a woman an abortion, was a deprivation of her personal liberty in privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment.' 9 4 The
court held that the Texas abortion statute was a violation of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 95
Another area to receive fundamental rights treatment under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is family living
arrangements. In Moore v. East Cleveland'9 6 an ordinance which
limited occupancy of houses to single families but defining family
so as to preclude the appellant from living with her two grandsons
was invalidated.
When a city undertakes such intrusive regulation of the family .

.

. the

usual judicial deference to the legislature is inappropriate .... [W]hen the
government intrudes on choices concerning family living arrangements, this
Court must examine carefully the importance of the governmental interests
advanced and the extent to which they are served by the challenged
'
regulation. 97

One other area to receive fundamental rights treatment under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment involves
the rights of the involuntarily committed. In Youngberg v. Romeo 9 8 on his mother's petition, respondent was involuntarily committed in a state institution. Respondent's mother was concerned
about certain injuries which respondent had suffered at the institution, and filed a section 1983 action against the institution's officials. '99 The complaint alleged that the respondent had suffered
certain injuries and that the institution failed to initiate preventative measures thus violating his rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment.2 0 0 The question presented was whether an individual,
who was involuntarily committed to a state mental institution, has
substantive rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to safe conditions of confinement, freedom from bodily restraint, and training or rehabilitation.2 0 ' The Court held that
the respondent had a constitutionally protected liberty interest
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
safe conditions of confinement, freedom from unreasonable bodily
194. Id. at 129.
195. Id. at 164.
196.

431 U.S. 494 (1977).

197. Id. at 499.
198.

457 U.S. 307 (1982).

199. Id. at 309.
200. Id. at 315-316.

201.

Id. at 309.
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restraints and minimal training required by those interests.2 02
As with substantive economic due process, substantive due process protection of individual rights has been limited by a number
of decisions. Concerning the right to privacy, the Court held in
Maher v. Roe2 0 3 that Roe v. Wade did not establish an unqualified
right to an abortion but only a right to be free from burdensome
interference by the state concerning abortion decisions. 24 Similarly
in Harris v. McRae2 05 the Court held that the Hyde Amendment,
limiting federal funding of abortion under Medicaid to those necessary to save the life of the mother, to be constitutional.0 6 These
cases established that while a woman had a privacy right from undue burden by the state in terminating a pregnancy, the right of
privacy did not extend to the states's affirmative duty to provide
07
the funding of abortion.
Concerning the area of family living arrangements, in Village of
Belle Terre v Boraas208 certain individuals leased their house to six
unrelated college students. These individuals challenged a zoning
ordinance which restricted land use to one-family dwellings. 0 9 The
ordinance defined family to mean not more than two unrelated
persons living together as a single unit.2 1 0 The Court upheld the
ordinance as economic legislation which bore a rational relation to
a legitimate state objective. 1 1
Having briefly traced the historical development of the concepts
of state action and substantive due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the focus of this note now shifts to an analysis of the
majority and dissenting opinions of Deshaney based on the application of these historical developments and other relevant material
germane to the opinions. In any section 1983 action, two essential
elements are necessary in order to obtain relief under this section:
(1) whether the conflict centers on conduct which was committed
by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) whether that
202. Id. at 321-322.
203. 432 U.S. 464 (1977). Maher concerned Connecticut's use of medicaid funds to
reimburse women for costs of only medically necessary first trimester abortions but not for
elective or therapeutic abortions. Id at 466.
204. Id. at 473-474.
205. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
206. Id. at 317.
207. Id. at 315-318.
208. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
209. Id. at 3.
210. Id. at 2.
211.

Id. at 8.
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conduct has deprived a person of his rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States.2 1 2
As the majority opinion developed, the petitioner's claim failed in
regard to both elements.
The majority opinion discussed at length that the conduct that
was the impetus, and in fact the cause, of Joshua Deshaney's injuries was the action and conduct of Randy Deshaney, Joshua's father. As plainly set forth in the Civil Rights Cases 1 3 "individual
invasion of individual rights is not the subject matter of the [Fourteenth] Amendment. ' 21 4 The regulation of private rights is not the
province of the Fourteenth Amendment but rather to provide a
mode of redress against the actions of state officials, legislative, executive, or judicial which subverts the fundamental rights guaranteed in the amendment.2 5 The petitioners did not, nor could they,
claim that Randy Deshaney was in any way performing a public or
governmental function as in Marsh v Alabama2 1 Randy Deshaney
was the actor responsible for Joshua Deshaney's injuries. The state
did not delegate or otherwise clothe Randy Deshaney with any
governmental authority. The petitioners could not claim that there
was significant involvement between the state and Randy
Deshaney so as to make his actions imputable to the state as recognized in Burton v. Wilmington ParkingAuthority 217 There was no
connection between Randy Deshaney and the state of Wisconsin
that would make his action attributable to the state. Furthermore,
there can be no claim that the government approved or in any way
encouraged the conduct of Randy Deshaney as in Reitman v.
Mulkey.""
In determining whether there was a sufficient nexus between
Randy Deshaney's action and the government, there is lacking any
degree of government encouragement in the actions that Randy
Deshaney took towards Joshua. It may be argued that the action of
DSS encouraged Randy Deshaney to continue to beat Joshua be212. Parrat v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 at 535 (1981). In Parrat,respondent, a prisoner at
a Nebraska correction facility, brought an action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 claiming a
violation of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process when property he ordered through mail
order was lost. Id. at 529. The court held that the Nebraska tort claims procedure provided
the proper remedy. Id. at 542.
213. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
214. Id. at 11.
215. Id.
216. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
217. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
218. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
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cause he was aware of DSS's insensitivity. However, this is precisely an example of an argument that is too attenuated from the
facts and lacking the necessary predicate of a sufficient nexus between the state action and private conduct. The state did not
physically abuse or take part in the conduct or action that resulted
in Joshua Deshaney's injuries. The "state action" requirement of a
section 1983 claim, based on the Fourteenth Amendment, is
absent.
The majority next addressed the concept of whether the conduct
of DSS deprived Joshua of his rights secured by the Constitution.
In the case of substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court recognized situations where the state acquired an affirmative duty to protect the life, liberty, or property
of its citizens. As a general matter, the Due Process Clause is normally thought of in the negative i.e., the state cannot take away
certain rights rather than in the affirmative i.e., the state has a
duty to provide certain rights.219 However in Youngberg v. Romeo 22 and Estelle v Gamble221 the Court recognized affirmative
duties on the part of the state. The majority points out that in
both Youngberg and Estelie it is only when the state confines or
otherwise limits an individual's ability to provide for his or her
needs that the Due Process Clause triggers affirmative duties of
care. 222 Joshua Deshaney was not confined by the state nor under
its protection at the time Randy Deshaney acted against him,2
therefore this avenue of substantive due process affords no
protection.
Finally, the majority addresses the concept of state tort law
principles as providing a possible mode of redress for the petitioners in this case. The majority points out that it may well be that
respondents acted negligently in their handling of the case of
Joshua Deshaney. 24 However in Daniels v. Williams2 25 the Court
219. Deshaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1004-1006.
220. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
221. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
222. Deshaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1005-1006.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1006.
225. 474 U.S. 327 (1986). "The petitioner sought to recover damages for injuries allegedly sustained when he fell on a prison stairway." Id. at 328. Petitioner claimed that respondent's negligence deprived him of his liberty interest in bodily integrity. Id. The issue was
whether tortious conduct by state officials rises to the level of constitutional tort under 42
U.S.C. Section 1983. Id. at 329. The Court held that the Due Process Clause is simply not
implicated by the negligent conduct of a state official. Id. at 334. "Where a government
official's acts causing injury to life, liberty or property is merely negligent, no procedure for

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 28:387

held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
does not provide a remedy for the negligent conduct of state officials or actors. 2 6 Similarily, as stated in Baker v. McCollan,2
"Section 1983 imposes liability for violations of rights protected by
the [Federal] Constitution, not for violations of duties of care arising out of tort law. Remedy for the latter type of injury must be
sought in state court under traditional tort-law principles."22' 8
Therefore, the petitioners best possible means of redress for the
injuries suffered lies not in a claim predicated in the Constitution
but rather in a claim against the state invoking traditional tort law
principles.2 29 The dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan is an attempt to transform the basic fact that Randy Deshaney was responsible for the injuries of Joshua Deshaney into a finding that
the State of Wisconsin was in actuality the cause of Joshua
Deshaney's injuries.
Justice Brennan characterizes the Youngberg v. Romeo 2 0 analysis, not as a question of confinement, but rather a case in which
the state acquired a duty because an individual was unable to care
for himself. Therefore when the state eliminates or restricts private
sources of aid, as the Wisconsin child protection laws did, the individuals were unable to care for themselves and the state acquired a
duty to provide protection to those individuals.
This argument fails because it is precisely the confinement
which triggers the affirmative duties of the state to provide minimal levels of care for the individual. The State of Wisconsin did
not confine Joshua Deshaney in the instant case and acquired no
duty absent such confinement. Justice Brennan's argument that
the Wisconsin child protection program, because it was administered solely by the state, effectively confined Joshua within his
home is a novel argument, but definitely not the type of confinement as elaborated in Youngberg and Estelle.
compensation is constitutionally required." Id. at 333.
226. Id. at 336.
227. 443 U.S. 137 (1979). Respondent was arrested and detained due to a question of
mistaken identity with his brother who had earlier been arrested. Id. at 141. Respondent
brought an action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment claiming a
violation of his liberty interest under the Due Process Clause. Id. The Court held that "although the respondent was detained, it was pursuant to a valid warrant." Id. at 143.
"Whatever claims this situation might give rise to under state tort law, we think it gives rise
to no claim under the United States Constitution." Id. at 144.
228. Id. at 146.
229. Deshaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1007.
230. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
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Justice Blackmun's dissent focuses on the nebulous concepts of
natural justice. The Justice would have the Constitution become a
source of law to redress any grievance that could conveniently fit
under the rubric of natural justice. As the historical development
of substantive economic due process and even substantive protections of individual rights shows, the Supreme Court is very wary to
transgress the boundaries of the rights enumerated in the Constitution itself and the powers given under the Constitution.
The error of Justice Blackmun's dissent is its lack of any case
law to support its claim. This dissent does not focus on the enumerated provisions of the Bill of Rights or the unenumerated fundamental rights such as privacy, family living arrangements or conditions of confinement. This dissent instead focuses on concepts
unique to the Justice and predicated on his own internal sense of
what he believes is right.
The Deshaney case puts forth a set of facts which require careful
reading and analysis. Although this case is predicated on a claim
involving the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it
is first and foremost a case concerning state action. The salient and
consequential fact of this case is that Randy Deshaney was the individual responsible for Joshua Deshaney's plight. Randy
Deshaney, and not the State of Wisconsin, was the actor in this
case. There is simply no state action in this case. Therefore, the
majority opinion takes the position that this case fails due to lack
of state action and the claim must stop there.
The majority also signals, by its holding, that the substantive
component of the Due Process Clause concerning individual rights
will not be expanded beyond the present sphere of the rights protected. Those opinions detailing the protected individual rights are
not going to be given an expansive reading.
It appears that the majority makes evident that there is a possible claim against the state involving negligence. The court is amenable to this type of action if the petitioner could prove that DSS
was negligent in the way they handled their monitoring of Joshua
Deshaney. The court signals that in cases of this type, in the future, the best course of action is that which is predicated on state
tort law principles. However, a claim under the same conditions
predicated on the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution will
not be entertained.
Jerome Kaharick

